What an ATO Really Is and How Authorizing Officials Decide

Many technology companies selling into the federal market treat an Authority to Operate (ATO) as a finish line, then watch the process stall without knowing why. Henry Sienkiewicz has seen this from the other side of the table. As Chief Information Officer and Authorizing Official for the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), he oversaw an organization that, in his words, did about 1,500 ATOs a year.
His view is that most vendors misunderstand what they are asking for. An ATO, he says, “is fundamentally a decision about trust. Government leaders aren’t approving documentation; they’re accepting mission risk.”
That changes how you should prepare. This article covers what an ATO represents, who makes the decision, why authorizations stall, and what gives an authorizing official the confidence to say yes.
What an ATO represents
An ATO is a formal decision by a specific person to accept mission risk. The government leader who signs it is acknowledging that your system can operate inside their environment, within defined boundaries, despite some uncertainty. It does not certify that the system is perfect.
That decision carries accountability, because it will be judged in hindsight if something goes wrong. So the signer’s real question is often whether the decision is reasonable, more than whether the system is secure.
Controls, documentation, and assessments are inputs that help explain a system. They don’t make the decision or define trust; a leader still has to interpret that information in context. As Sienkiewicz put it, the judgment “sits on top of compliance; it’s not inside of it.” That is why authorization can’t be reduced to a checklist.
Who makes the ATO decision
One person signs, but several roles determine whether that person can sign with confidence.
The authorizing official (AO) makes the final decision. Most vendors never meet their AO, who sits behind layers of reviewers and certifiers. It is a leadership role: the AO interprets technical evidence in a mission context and carries organizational and professional accountability, for accepting the system. Sienkiewicz poses a hard question to vendors: why would an AO accept that liability for your system if your own organization would not?
System owners are the people you will usually work with most, often the customer or a federal systems integrator. They are responsible for understanding how the software operates and for connecting architecture, operations, and governance. Without clear ownership, accountability breaks down.
Engineers decide whether a system can be governed later. Early architecture decisions determine visibility, control, and explainability, and those choices have long-term consequences for authorization. ATO readiness: engineering a system for authorization
Reviewers are the government staff evaluating the submission. They aren’t there to coach you. They are building a mental model of the system: its boundaries, dependencies, ownership, where its software and hardware come from, and what happens when something goes wrong.
When these roles don’t share a clear understanding, the process breaks down, so it is in your economic interest to help coordinate them.
Why ATOs stall
According to Sienkiewicz, most ATO stalls come from a lack of understanding rather than missing controls.
Your system may be clean. The government still has to work out how it fits into their environment and whether adding it increases or decreases risk. When boundaries are unclear or dependencies are hidden, leaders can’t confidently accept that risk.
Commercial products are especially exposed. They are optimized for speed and scale rather than explainability, and abstracted layers, hidden dependencies, and unexplained external calls obscure how a system behaves. Strong products struggle in authorization because reviewers can’t interpret them.
The four questions behind every ATO
Sienkiewicz reduces the decision to four questions:
- What is the system?
- Who owns it?
- What does it depend on?
- What happens if it fails?
Most organizations answer the first two well. The third is harder. Sienkiewicz calls the fourth “the golden question,” and it is the one vendors find hardest to convey to their sponsors. A submission that answers all four clearly gives an AO something to reason with. One that leaves dependencies and failure behavior vague leaves the AO carrying risk they can’t see.
Can you get an ATO with open risks?
Yes. A common misconception is that every risk must be closed first. An authorization can be granted with open risks, documented in a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) that sets out how they will be resolved. Authorizations can also be interim, time-bound, or geographically bound.
Sienkiewicz described authorizing high-risk systems with known vulnerabilities because a mission needed them, with the authorization bounded by geography or time. The condition is that the risk is declared up front. A system owner who urgently needs the capability also strengthens the case.
That openness applies to you as well. Be candid with your government customers from the start. If a customer discovers that something was shaded, the relationship goes back to the beginning.
What gives an authorizing official confidence
Asked what gave him the confidence to approve a system, Sienkiewicz didn’t point to documentation. “No AO believes everything is clean,” he said. “It’s about believing in the team, and understanding how to mitigate and minimize the risk.”
At DISA, when he knew a program might have issues, his team sat with the engineers months before any authorization documentation was due. Confidence came from the team, its processes, and that early engagement, which let the government interpret the system and intervene when needed.
When to start preparing for an ATO
Start the moment you decide to enter the federal market. You won’t win a long-term federal customer without an ATO.
Starting late is expensive. Sienkiewicz has seen companies change approach partway through and redo six months of work, which a small company can’t afford. Starting early means knowing which impact level or FedRAMP level you are designing to, and building good engineering and process documentation from the beginning. One emerging company he advises built ISO compliance in from the start and got through that process in about a month.
It also means dropping the checklist mentality. Running an ATO purely as a compliance exercise misses its intent, which is to show a customer that your product is worth their trust, time, and money. Security and compliance are different jobs.
The government wants you to succeed, Sienkiewicz stressed, and agencies are frustrated when they can’t bring in a product that could be transformational in how they work. If the AO and system owners are spending time with you, it’s because they want you on the team. Making the decision easy to reason about is how you earn that place.
Prepare for your ATO with expert guidance
RapidFort’s complimentary ATO readiness program walks teams through the authorization process step by step. Learn about the ATO readiness cohort.
Latest posts
Eliminate Attack Vectors at the Source
Continuously eliminate up to 99.9% of CVEs without code changes
Products
Use Case
Quicklinks
Stay in touch
Subscribe for product updates and RapidFort newsletter.
Address
440 North Wolfe Road, Sunnyvale, CA 94085
© 2026 RapidFort, Inc.
RapidFort, RAPIDFORT, and RBOM® are registered trademarks of RapidFort, Inc. All other marks and names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies.



